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Major routes to identifying individual differences (in diverse species) include studies of behaviour patterns as represented in language and neurophysiology. But results from these approaches appear not to converge on some major dimensions. Identifying dimensions of human variation least applicable to non-human species may help to partition human-specific individual differences of recent evolutionary origin from those shared across species. Human culture includes learned, enforced social-norm systems that are symbolically reinforced and referenced in displays signalling adherence. At a key juncture in human evolution bullying aggression and deception-based cheating apparently became censured in the language of a moral community, enabling mutual observation coordinated in gossip, associated with external sanctions. That still-conserved cultural paradigm moralistically regulates selfish advantage-taking, with shared semantics and explicit rules. Ethics and moral codes remain critical and universal components of human culture and have a stronger imprint in language than most aspects of the currently popular Big-Five taxonomy, a model that sets out five major lines of individual-differences variation in human personality. In other species (e.g. chimpanzees), human observers might see apparent individual differences in morality-relevant traits, but not because the animals have human-analogue sanctioning systems. Removing the moral dimension of personality and other human-specific manifestations (e.g. religion) may aid in identifying those other bases of individual differences more ubiquitous across species.
This article is part of the theme issue 'Diverse perspectives on diversity: multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies of individual differences'.
Defining a basic conundrum
Individual differences are a prime ingredient in the workings of evolutionary natural selection across species. Within-species variation is one of the three necessary and sufficient conditions, recognized since Darwin [1] , for natural selection to occur; the other two are heritability of trait differences, and differential fitness based on traits. This is certainly the case among humans and other primates. A species with insufficient individual differences might lack raw material upon which selection could operate.
Among humans, the understanding of individual differences has scientific importance in several ways: assessment, prediction and establishing a background for understanding any particular individual's behaviour. Variation in the potentially stable patterns of behaviour, thinking, emotion or motivation that characterize individuals, i.e. personality, is a longstanding focal point for studies of psychological individual differences. It is clear that personality patterns of humans (and other primates) differ in multiple ways, and scientists create multivariate models in attempting to capture the most important differences.
There are two highly influential but contrasting embarkation points for such models, and these have affinity with those prominently identified for the study & 2018 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
of emotion [2, 3] . One begins with individual differences as, largely, a language-based sociocultural construct; it starts with concepts representing phenotypic characteristics encoded in human language, thus beginning with shared social representations at a global level. Presumably, the personality characteristics most worthy of study are those that people find important enough to talk about, so they are the most highly emphasized in natural-language semantics. This is an assumption from which the 'lexical approach' [4] is built. As one indicant of the value of this approach, it has led to highly influential models of five [5] and six factors [6] that currently organize scientific personality research. These models propose that human personality variation can be mapped along continuous dimensions of extraversion, emotional stability versus emotionality, open-mindedness, conscientiousness, agreeableness and (for the six-factor model) honesty. This approach is well fitted to understanding human personality variation, because it draws on the same categories the individuals under study are using, which are, in good part, categories of reputation or self-concept that have real effects in human interaction. In judgement about animals, on the other hand, such an approach might problematically apply a human perceptual filter [7] . If hypothetically, the communicative language of an animal species could be decoded and then used to study that species, there would be less bias from the human perceptual filter, and that would be an important approach to explore. But only humans have a naturally evolved semiotic language that can provide a major avenue of approach for studying individual differences.
The other embarkation point starts with concepts distilled from studies of physiology or neural functioning, thus beginning at a far more granular level. Presumably, the personality characteristics most worthy of study are those springing most directly from basic lines of variation in the brain or physiology, such as neurotransmitters or aspects of brain anatomy. Along these lines, a number of models have been proposed. Eysenck's classic model linked extraversion and neuroticism with proposed neurophysiological sources of variation [8] . Gray emphasized variation in behavioural-activation and behavioural-inhibition systems, partially related to Eysenck's dimensions, as well as a fight/flight system [9] , whereas reinforcement-sensitivity theory refines Gray's basic dimensions [10] . Quite differently, Cloninger proposed biological temperament dimensions of novelty-seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence and persistence [11] . As Uher [12] observes, such models benefit from studies of nonhuman species, which is sensible given that so much of the genome and so many biological mechanisms are conserved across species, particularly within a taxonomic order like primates, or a narrower grouping like the apes.
Recent studies of animal behaviour patterns (including 'animal personality') fall on a continuum between these extremes: like the inside-out approach, they might lead to a privileged insight into biological bases of human personality, but as in the outside-in approach they focus on phenotypic characteristics. Those studies that use human-languagederived adjective variables in a top-down manner [13, 14] export aspects of the lexical approach to animals, which enhances human -animal comparability though with the danger that this imposes human framings on non-human individuals [15, 16] . Those studies that derive categories/ variables in a bottom-up manner from behaviours and situations well fitted to a given non-human species [17] begin more by taking the animal on the animal's own terms, which probably enhances the capacity to provide a perspective divergent from what is found with human language categories and data.
A major scientific problem is that results from neurophysiology approaches and from most studies based on patterns in the semantics of languages appear not to converge on a full set of major dimensions. Most of the neurophysiology-based models of individual differences cited earlier (first three of the four) have only two dimensions to map readily onto the five or six lexically-based dimensions; the one with four dimensions (last of the four) has mostly modest relations with the lexically based dimensions [18] . Although optimistic empiricists [19] have theorized that these two different lines of approach will readily converge, and there are surely points of convergence, agreements are incomplete and far from precise. For example, we have elegant biologically based theories of personality that are imperfectly reproduced in phenotypic data, such as that of Cloninger previously referenced [11, 20] . We also have theory proposals that poorly link phenotypes to underlying causal factors [21, 22] as in the models associated with Eysenck [8] . We have models that are far less comprehensive than lexically derived models, as with many 'dual-process' models such as a commonly used derivative of Gray's theory [9, 23] . We also have proposals that are simply all about the associations with one variable, such as dopamine [24] . From the other side, we have the popular six-and especially five-factor models [5, 6] , which have clear limitations on cross-population generalizability (undercutting the biological-basis argument) and for which, moreover, derivation of biological accounts to match the constructs has proved challenging. Often, it seems [25] that one must fractionate major dimensions in order to identify a coherent neurophysiological rationale. I suggest that some apparent limitations of these models in empirical data may be due to distortions introduced by the impact of certain evolutionarily recent filters on personality perception, and once these filters are better accounted for, the empirical strengths of neurophysiological models will be easier to see and assess.
Specifically, this article sets out the hypothesis that the prime basis for this disconnect between results of lexical and neurophysiological methods for deriving models of personality is the strong overlay of (or filter provided by) moral distinctions in personality language. As a result of this overlay, the most compelling organizations of natural-language concepts are perturbed by moral distinctions, and thereby become defined in a manner that, while highly sensible to everyday users of the language, fit rather poorly the aims of the biology-oriented personality researcher. To assess and detect convergence between lexically and approaches used in studying animal behaviour-patterns, it will help to employ a set of variables that, while inclusive, focuses on variables that are, relatively, indifferently applicable across many species. Such variables might be achieved simply by imposing human-language concepts (e.g. descriptive adjectives) on animals, or more circuitously by developing species-specific bottom-up descriptions of tendencies-in-situations that turn out, in some cases, to generalize nicely not only to other species but also to humans.
Let us compare the human-personality situation with that of chimpanzees. A large, recent study using an adjectiveimposition approach comes from Latzman et al. [13] . They rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170170 examined human ratings of 238 captive chimps on a 41-item personality questionnaire (from Freeman et al. [26] ). There were two particularly large dimensions, one labelled as 'mischievous, aggressive, impulsive, bullying' (otherwise summarized as defiant and undercontrolled), and the other as 'affectionate/friendly, intelligent, affiliative, inquisitive/ curious' (summarized as sociability). The first of these might appear to have similarity to a human 'morality' dimension, if morality is defined loosely in terms of cooperation or sympathy, as many researchers allow it to be [27, 28] . But a few caveats are in order: (i) the dimension may reflect how troublesome (as opposed to tame) the animal is in captivity, towards its keepers, thus understandably reflecting the practical perspective of the raters, (ii) it may, in other more general ways, be an anthropomorphic projection of a dimension with which the raters are (like any human) preoccupied, perhaps enabled by the questionnaire's use of adjectives (e.g. considerate) usually applied to human behaviour [15, 17] , (iii) it is not a very robust constellation, because upon extraction of more than two factors, this dimension breaks apart into components that appear far less moral in nature (such as disinhibition and negative emotionality), and (iv) if morality is defined, as some prominent theorists do [29 -31] , more narrowly and stringently, as a set of explicit rules constraining self-interest, it becomes difficult to infer morality from those behavioural tendencies. All four caveats point towards considerable noncomparability between a human morality dimension and any animal-personality dimensions.
Another recent study compared the structure of personality descriptions (using a questionnaire adapted from humanpersonality studies) of six different species of macaques [14] . Results similarly showed the lack of a real moral dimension, inasmuch as no result was interpreted as essentially moral or altruistic. The closest morality analogues were frequently arising dimensions of variation in friendliness (how affectionate, also helpful or friendly or sympathetic, the individual macaque was judged to be), and an opportunism dimension (how jealous, stingy and bullying) found specifically among Assamese macaques. Some of these terms imply human moral distinctions, but one cannot exclude possible selfregarding motives (in being helpful to another or in refraining from bullying). Interpretation of such studies applying questionnaires with human-language personality adjectives to animals need some caution given evidence that they enable bias and stereotyping [17] .
The non-appearance of an authentic morality factor in animal personality may not be a mere accident of which items appear on an animal-personality questionnaire. An asymmetry is straightforwardly observable. There is a subset of frequently used descriptors for human personality that are preposterous to apply to a non-human; examples are polite, honest, fair, respectable, rude, sarcastic, selfcentred, phoney (connected to a morality dimension), as well as religious, conservative, liberal and open-minded (connected with the signalling of a cultural/moral system). To illustrate how such asymmetry might be made even more dramatic, imagine a questionnaire whereby individual animals were rated as to how good, immoral, ashamed, guiltprone, contemptuous (or contemptible), authentic, or philosophical they are, or rather they might be described by terms like 'jerk' or 'twit.' Such stimuli would force human judges into odd anthropomorphic projections, as critiqued previously [15, 17] .
It is worthwhile to examine why they are odd. By and large, they force an assumption that an animal is adhering to internalizations of some of the standards that humans acquire by socialization, thus each representing a version of the pathetic fallacy (erroneous personifying of non-human entities). Animals' behaviour can certainly be self-regulated to some degree (e.g. based on fear of aggression or retaliation) but to imply self-regulation by an explicit normative system (or by regular reference to explicit rules, as in attributes like logical and reasonable) is fallacious.
Observing animals, human observers may reliably detect ( perhaps, project) individual differences in tendencies to seek/maintain alpha status (i.e. bullying and deceptive manipulation). They could label this as some kind of morality dimension. But with the apparent lack of a detailed, learned social-norm system and regularized collective action against dominant individuals, examples [32] of ways in which chimps actually can sanction one another-for what humans would regard as exploitative behaviour-seem quite attenuated [33, 34] . Accordingly, there is a certain asymmetry between human and animal (e.g. chimp) personality, due to the absence (in animals) of social and moral norms, not to mention the absence of explicitly signal-able systems of thought that contain such norms. In the terms used by Uher [12] , morality versus immorality would be a speciesspecific rather than a species-comparative trait dimension, a trait domain unique to human targets of description, as well as human describers. While traces of morality, or precursors of morality, might be found among animals, the thick representation and systematization of such elements is human-species -specific.
It may be helpful in resolving this conundrum, and bridging human-to animal-personality research, to consider which dimensions of human variation might have the least easy applicability to non-human species, so that they might be considered separately. In this way, one might partition away the more human-specific sources of individual-differences variation-likely to be of more recent origin-from those found in common with other species. Those in common are presumably conserved from their roots in a common ancestral population in the very distant past. I propose here that the key differentiating dimension(s) will be found related to culture.
Culture, norms and morality
Humans have been, aptly I believe, called 'cultural animals' [35, 36] . Culture is not incidental to human life but profoundly important to it. Other species give evidence of fragmentary cultural learning, but human cultural learning is distinct in being rapid, fuelled by capacities for wholesale imitation, in being cumulative, and in its facilitation by sophisticated uses of language [37] . Animal-behaviour researchers are prone (generously) to label as 'culture' various scattered socially learned practices like regularities in playing with the hair or fingers of another individual [38] that might otherwise be labelled merely as isolated social-behaviour traditions, or just sustained practices. Some recognize that strongly cumulative culture, built on multiple and sustained traditions, is a whole other level of culture [38] And without culture, on a sheer physical level, humans are less well-equipped to survive naked-and-without-tools in the world than their primate cousins; chimpanzees, though smaller, have agility and superior muscular performance [39] . In the course of evolution, humans have traded off body power (muscle strength) for brain power [40] , making up for an increasingly underdeveloped physical survival vehicle with an elaborated cultural survival vehicle [41] with systems of technology, language and culture. This has enabled humans to outcompete physically superior opponents in their evolutionary history [42] .
Because animal behaviour researchers are prone to a particularly generous application of the term, to avoid misunderstanding it will help to define culture exactly. As understood convergently in cultural psychology and cultural anthropology, culture involves ideas or information that are shared and transmitted [37,43 -45] . A more precise synthesis would define culture as a body of ideas (norms, rules, standards, values, beliefs), rather than mainly behaviours, that are shared by a group of individuals and passed on from one generation to the next. Even when culture is occasionally defined as a particular group of individuals, that would be a group exposed to a large set of shared ideas [37] . Certainly, non-human species can possess beliefs and possibly values, although without these being a large set forming a system that is transmitted. As Hill [43] has observed, culture in humans goes beyond rudimentary technologies for specific ends like feeding, into enforced, learned social-norm systems that are symbolically reinforced and are referenced in displays that signal adherence (to a specific system). Distinctly, human cultures have enforced social norms existing within rule systems-including ethics, morality, rituals and religionto which persons demonstrate their specific adherence and allegiance by specific communicative display [43] .
Social and moral norms are components of culture long emphasized by prominent sociologists [46, 47] and anthropologists [48, 49] . They characteristically go against self-interest (demand altruism), have sanctions (even if only informal) attached to their violation, and moreover involve a shared expectation that one ought to observe it and that others expect one to observe it [50] . Moral norms can be considered a type of social norms, but are more stringent and unconditional, and have more severe sanctions, than social norms generally [30] .
Indeed, it can be argued that morality is central to culture [51] . Culture frames shared-knowledge conceptions of what is normative. Ethical rules (and those conventions that we might term social norms but not moral norms) are quite distinct to human culture, and some of these are backed up by enforced sanctions (via punishment or reward) [43] . Thus, moral behaviour, and the labelling of any behaviour as moral or immoral, is contingent on culturally learned knowledge-about rules and standards with regard to what is considered good or bad, right or wrong, selfish or unselfish.
That central part of culture found in morality drives a core part of human personality variation that which might be labelled 'degree of moral character' (how much one adheres to moral norms). Sanctioning is partly carried on verbally through application of highly evaluative personality language; as Hill [43] observes, people 'experience feelings of anger, fairness, justice, indignation, guilt, and so on and categorize other humans as jerks, assholes, self-centred, egotists, sleazeballs, criminals, villains, and so on when they
and so on', whereas one sees 'little evidence that primates show similar emotional responses to deviants who fail to adhere to the local socially learned traditions' (p. 281). A dimension of adherence versus resistance to social norms (as reflected in politeness or rudeness) and moral norms (as reflected in honesty, integrity and psychopathy, or summarized as moral character) is more difficult to apply outside the human species. These characteristics involve not merely the degree of observable friendliness or aggression or bullying, they involve rule systems and regulatory constraint by rules that go against self-interest.
The most evaluative personality language tends to be about adherence to or violation of moral norms. Hampson, John and Goldberg [52] reported reliable social desirability values for 573 personality adjectives. Among those terms administered to both British and American raters, the most evaluatively extreme were honest, kind and sincere at one pole, and cruel, deceitful, dishonest and insincere at the other pole. This is evidence of strong verbal sanctioning of deceit and cruelty, across two populations.
The priority given to moral contents can be seen also in value priorities. Schwartz & Bardi [53] found, across diverse populations from around the globe, surprising consensus in the relative ranking of values. Benevolence values (e.g. being honest, helpful, forgiving) topped a values hierarchy with high cross-cultural consensus. Characteristically, moral rules and obligations are naturally given a high priority, as reflected in strong sanctions, capacity to trump other social rules and norms, and applicability to everyone [31] .
Turning from valuing of attributes over to descriptions of human behaviour patterns, we find ubiquitous impact of ethical and moral concerns. Not that moral dutifulness is evenly characteristic of most humans, or easy for them, but merely that these codes have wide impact [54] . It also appears that attributes associated with morality and ethics are richly represented in every language, and thus available for gossip and talk about reputation. Saucier et al. [55] , in a study of twelve mutually isolated languages from diverse parts of the globe, demonstrated that morally relevant attribute concepts are cross-culturally ubiquitous to a striking degree. Such concepts are as ubiquitous as concepts like how physically large or attractive someone is. Perhaps, the most incisive explanation for why humans significantly vary on a moral dimension, and thus feel a need to talk about it so much, comes from Bailey [54] : it reflects tension between the competing pressures of two powerful forces, self-interest and social/cultural rules and norms.
As for the centrality of a dimension of personality among humans, the most emphatic evidence for this point comes from studies of type-nouns, which tend to be more evaluative than adjectival descriptors of personality. Saucier [56] derived factors from the correlations among 372 highly familiar American-English type-nouns from ratings of 607 people. What is the centre of gravity for this kind of descriptor? As indicated by Saucier's Table 10-1 [57] , the most prominent constellation of type-nouns have moral content, much of it focusing on deceit (e.g. weasel, phony, fake, liar, deceiver, crook), supporting contentions [58] that honesty is the single most important dimension of personality. It appears that a substantial driving force in type-nouns (even rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170170 excluding the expletive type-nouns that have the same function) is shaming norm violators by way of contemptuous labelling, which would obviously function to maintain the cultural-moral rule system.
As for adjectives, Saucier et al. [59] examined lexical-study datasets from a very diverse set of nine languages from Africa, Asia and Europe. They found that the largest constellation of adjective descriptors was associated with a strongly evaluative dimension in which a majority of most of the strongly associated terms represented some facet of morality, terms such as honest, generous, diligent, good, kind, patient, respectful, responsible, conscientious, dependable, dutiful, gentle, helpful, humane, polite, as opposed to selfish, egocentric, greedy, stingy and lazy.
This section depicts a highly salient situation one encounters upon close examination of human culture, morality and language used to characterize people. Morality (a set of explicit rules constraining self-interest) constitutes a crucial part of culture, and this finds a strong imprint in personality language. Humans use such language to characterize others in terms of reputation and likely behavioural tendencies.
Can the same be said of animals, of other species? One must grant that a number of other species have demonstrated the capacity to transmit very specific social-behavioural traditions [38] , though not a body of them taught as a coherent whole. One finds premoral sentiments-such as recognition of unfairness and signs of empathy-in other species but little evidence of helping others in a way that disadvantages oneself (as human social and moral norms by definition require) [60] . Where, for example, primate behaviour could appear altruistic, it is typically difficult to discount rival explanations such as limited understanding of experimental-task contingencies, or an underlying selfregarding motive [61] . Where an individual animal demonstrates a sensitivity to unfair outcomes, this appears to be sensitivity only to the disadvantaging of self, rather than oriented to helping others at cost to self, and there is scant evidence even for sanctioning (e.g. punishing) another for unfair behaviour [62] . There is little evidence of concern for another's well-being where that is at cost to one's own well-being [63] . One finds signs that an individual within an animal group may develop some kind of implicit reputation among others who can name their name [64] , but not signs that this is elaborated into steady streams of communication about individuals' characteristics that function either to objectively describe or to praise or cajole them. This is not to argue, as was done too often in the past, that humans are innately superior to other species due to morality and culture, but simply to note the direction in which unique human adaptations have proceeded. We should assume that natural selection has bestowed on other species, through their own unique directions of adaptation, advantageous capacities that humans lack. I argue for the conception of humans as cultural and moral animals as a fact-wellbased in empirical evidence. How to account for it? How did this adaptation develop?
Tracing the evolution of morality
Boehm [33, 65] provides a plausible, insightful account of how hominins moved from a paradigm lacking in moralistic culture (as in chimpanzees) to one in which it was central. It is, in other words, an account of how morality became a human-species -specific trait dimension. The account goes as follows. Chimps demonstrate, sporadically, a capacity for overthrowing excessively advantage-taking dominant alpha animals, in anti-hierarchical rebellion by resentful subordinates. Thus, we can infer that a preadaptation for resistance to anti-egalitarian bullying aggression was presumably in place in the last common ancestor of chimps and humans (at perhaps 6 million years ago). When ancestral hominins (assuming a small-band organization such as is characteristic of foraging societies) took up cooperative hunting of large game-in which success required cooperative teamwork among multiple hunters-bands with domineering alphamales would function less smoothly, given resentment towards alphas taking an unequal share of the food obtained. In this new situation, there could be selection against both (i) individuals who were bullies rather than team-players and (ii) bands dominated by such bullies. So, presumably, bullying aggression came to be defined more systematically as deviance, by at least rudimentary social norms, with punishments extending to expulsion or even execution. In this situation, selection would favour those who internalized the social rules, exercising norm-based self-regulation, and thereby avoided punishment. This, according to Boehm, was the evolutionary origin of conscience, as a pattern of self-control favoured by natural selection.
Over time, our human ancestors presumably became greatly concerned with reputations as informed by processes of gossip, inasmuch as a bad reputation would lead to major sanctions impacting survival and reproductive capacity. The resultant 'selection by reputation' reinforced an increasing level of self-regulation in the population. In Boehm's view, bullying aggression was originally the prime moral violation, but deception-based cheating was eventually added. Indeed, in a manner virtually universal across cultures, we see moral codes prohibiting forms of injury and killing, but also lying, theft and other forms of cheating. Further along, the other pole of the moral dimension was imprinted: moralistic culture identified desirable attributes (such as virtues) and advocated for generosity and other altruistic behaviours (rather than merely avoidance of norm-violation). (For an analogous distinction, labelled as that between minatory and hortatory moral rules, see Findlay [66] .) It is not entirely clear when our hominin ancestors first developed language. The most relevant issue here would be when did language develop enough so that social rules could be explicitly referenced, and undesirable and desirable attributes. Some [67, 68] give the arising of gossip a central place in the evolution of language, noting e.g. that the grammatical structure of language with subject, verb and object [or adjective] is nicely suited for storytelling about others. One can certainly imagine internalization of rules without language-the behaviour-outcome expectancies that are the cognitive corollary of operant conditioning might be loosely considered internalized rules. However, it is harder to imagine extensive gossip, selection-by-reputation and advocacy of altruistic behaviour without language. Language enabled mutual observation to be coordinated in gossip that could lead to external sanctions (or the threat of it) by a community united in an ethos and its accompanying potent semantic representations, not to mention direct rewards for appearing altruistic (e.g. in a mate-attraction context). Thus, language would facilitate selection effects on the human gene-pool.
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The foregoing is a reasonable (although speculative) account of the development of a cultural paradigm that has been in place since the Palaeolithic. The contents of human cultures always include moral codes, that is, social rules and associated values that function to moralistically suppress upstarts who might take advantage of their fellows (bullying aggression and deceptive cheating being two prime forms of proscribed behaviour). Gossip and, in general, reputational talk uses the instrument of language to derogate, rebuke or ridicule instances of disvalued behaviour, and to praise helpful behaviour.
Thus, the use of moralistic personality-language is not an idle talk or merely bemused observation, it is an instrument for delivering social consequences. Indeed, it is part of the reason why small-scale societies can do without a police force. Human language is an instrument of reputational selection, thus a strong moral filter is built in. Similarly, most likely ancestral humans were not mainly using personalitylanguage in casual speculation about what makes each individual tick, or what makes them unique (in the mode of Gordon Allport). They were using personality-language to cajole, mould and sanction others. Here, we have largely language-dependent processes integral to human culture, and missing (except in the form of minor analogues) in other primate species.
Towards resolving the conundrum
Individual differences matter. There are lexical and neurophysiological routes to modelling these, which tend not to agree greatly. Although questionnaire stimuli borrowed from human-personality research may be useful occasionally for the comparison of human and animal behaviour structures, animal-behaviour researchers who use these borrowed-over stimuli may overestimate potential agreement due to anthropomorphic projection; it would be useful to correct for this with specific behaviour observations [15] . And perhaps we should not expect them to agree greatly, because the human languages are infused with content related to morality and cultural-system adherence that would be fallacious to apply to non-human animals, whereas the latter relies heavily on evidence from such animals. Moreover, in actual practice human personality description is intimately involved with processes by which reputation affects outcomes, being invoked heavily in that criticism and praise that functions to maintain a cultural system. The strong imprint of moral considerations on language is empirically evident, and systematically underestimated by most personality scientists. (One reason for this underestimate may be the desire to advance neurophysiological models that are equally applicable to animals.) Judgements about morality constitute arguably the central dimension of personality among humans, and this is clearly not so among animals (unless one succumbs to the pathetic fallacy, i.e. erroneous personifying of non-human entities).
With this background, we can return to the problem stated at the outset of this article. Because of this morality component, the scientifically subversive aspect of which (from the standpoint of neuropsychic dispositions) was anticipated by Allport & Odbert [69] , application of a lexical approach to identifying personality dimensions seems to not lead directly to neuro-physiological bases of personality.
On the other hand, because of the centrality of moral (cultural) distinctions to everyday use of personality concepts, a neuro-physiological model based entirely on humananimal analogues would be incomplete, far from comprehensive. Never the twain shall meet?
In responding to this situation, it helps first to acknowledge it by reducing the contribution of anthropomorphic projection or other human biases to behavioural observations of animals. Rather than routinely borrowing over human-personality measures into the animal domain, helpful will be development of species-specific rating categories based on salient behaviours (and related situations) in each species [17] . This provides a needed correction on the animal behaviour -research side.
As for the human side, we should hope potentially to generate a model in which results of a lexical research approach might most/more closely match those arising out of neurophysiological research. To this end, I suggest an approach that begins by eliminating the areas of asymmetry. Because the asymmetries between human and animal personality centre on moral/cultural concerns, there are theory-driven reasons to set (fix) a first factor (or more than one, if necessary) to reflect variation in traits that humans are most prone to moralize. As a matter of technical feasibility for the data-analyst, setting or fixing a factor is a procedure readily accomplished via modern target-rotation procedures (e.g. [70, 71] ).
How does one verify that a particular empirical dimension or variable is a bona fide morality factor? There is a series of questions that can be asked regarding any personality construct or factor. The first question: Is one pole of this dimension far different in judged social desirability than the other pole? For example, is it far more desirable to be extraverted than to be introverted? (Probably not.) The second question: can one strongly associate virtue (rather than some other desirable feature such as competence, attractiveness or social status) with one end of this dimension, and violation of moral rules or social norms with the other end? And the third question: with respect to this dimension, does it appear that the answers to the first two questions will generalize well across cultural contexts (i.e. that the relative (un)desirability, the characterization as a virtue or as a violation is not at all culture-specific)? To the extent the answer to all three questions is 'yes', we have a dimension-or a component of that dimension-that it makes sense to posit first, in a theory-driven way.
Fixing in place, and thereby removing, a morality dimension is not the same as various previously used procedures (which have been labelled as 'desirability-partialling', 'nonevaluative personality constructs', or 'principal factor deletion' [72 -75] ). The variable defined by the relative social desirability of attributes-how evaluative they are-answers 'yes' to the first question above, but not clearly 'yes' to the other two. The reason is that, although moralized traits may have the greatest evaluative extremity, some attributes other than moral ones are extreme in either a desirable or undesirable direction. Because of the very common conflations people make between distinct characteristics in their evaluations [76] , removing evaluation removes morality plus a mixture of other highly desirable-or-undesirable characteristics that may be culture-specific. For example, British and American raters judge intelligent, sociable and stable to be highly desirable, and ignorant, apathetic and rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 373: 20170170 humourless to be highly undesirable [34] , and these are not morally relevant characteristics.
It does appear that the morality dimension to be presupposed is singular, or close to singular. Any personality inventory with a highly moralized dimension tends to have just one. For example, the Big Five Inventory (BFI)'s [77] only highly moralized dimension is agreeableness (representing trust, kindness, politeness, unselfishness, etc.). But in the HEXACO personality inventory [78] , which references the prominent six-factor model of personality, it is honesty/ humility, which has a substantial correlation with BFI agreeableness, whereas the HEXACO agreeableness factor is distinctly less moralized than BFI agreeableness (though they share the same name). The centre of gravity for a single morality dimension would need to take in avoidance of cheating and both generous altruism and avoidance of bullying aggression. As these prominent examples imply, there does not as yet appear to be any personality model that fully satisfies the criterion of the 'eliminate the asymmetries approach'.
As a side note, there is a case for eliminating also variables related to ideology or worldview, including religion. This issue seems more minor because these kinds of variables have shown less tendency to associate with behavioural dimensions [79, 80] . But holding these contents out will help ensure more comparability between results of lexical and neurophysiological research approaches, by getting the focus closer to variables that could be applied indifferent to whether the target of description is from the human or some other species.
To avoid any confusion, it is best to clarify two things that partitioning away of the most moral-cultural contents is not intended to imply. First, there is no judgement here that these contents should be fixed or for certain purposes set aside because they are unimportant, or because personality psychologists should be not be studying them (as Allport & Odbert [69] argued). On the contrary, these are remarkably important aspects of personality. Second, I do not imply, and one must not assume, that individual differences in moral or cultural relevant dimensions are non-heritable, or only a product of environmental socialization. Turkheimer's [81] law, that any form of phenotypic variation will be substantially heritable, certainly applies here. As Boehm [65] argued, selection in favour of self-control, conscience, ruleinternalization, altruism and against bullying, cheating have had plenty of time ( probably thousands of generations) to accrue substantial effects on the gene pool. Sussman & Cloninger [82] have argued that biological mechanisms underlie some of the variation in altruism and cooperation.
Conclusion
It should prove useful to partition the domain of personality variables into (i) those that are observable in an animal species, and may even be observable across numerous species and relate to evolutionarily conserved processes, and (ii) those of a distinct moral and/or cultural nature, less readily applicable to other species and related to more recent emergences in evolution. With respect to animal-behaviour research, keeping (i) and (ii) separate will reduce bias and projection, and provide greater fidelity to the verifiable tendencies in animal behaviour. With respect to human personality, separating these elements will be helpful in arriving at scientific consensus in the study of personality, probably affording better integration between neurophysiological and lexically derived models of personality.
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